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Disentangling Choice of Law for Torts
and Contracts
By Frederic L. Kirgis∗
Abstract
In a federal system with state lines that are easily crossed,
physically and electronically, legal disputes often raise choice-oflaw issues. Common among those disputes are torts and contracts
cases. The courts have taken a variety of approaches to these cases,
leading to inconsistent results that depend largely on which forum
the plaintiff selects. Judicial fairness and economy dictate, or
should dictate, that the choice-of-law issues be resolvable
consistently and without unnecessarily tying up the courts or
imposing large litigation costs, if it can be done in a principled
manner. This article shows how it could be done.
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I. From Rules to Policies

A century ago, almost all judges and scholars faced with
choice-of-law issues thought that the goal was to achieve
predictable, uniform results that would be reached regardless of
the judicial forum in which the issue was to be decided. Why, it
was asked, should the plaintiff’s choice of forum dictate the
result?1 That would be unfair, not to mention unsettling, for
judges who would have to work out choice-of-law puzzles without
principled guidance. Thus, what was needed—and what was
actually in place under the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
at least nominally—was a choice-of-law system that would lead
any court that might hear a case to the same result that any
other court would reach. For example, the First Restatement
dictated that in tort cases, the law of the place of wrong would
determine whether or not a cause of action existed.2 This seemed
particularly important, as long-arm jurisdictional rules became
increasingly flexible, allowing plaintiffs an expanding
opportunity to forum shop.3
Along came the choice-of-law revolution that the late
Brainerd Currie spurred, who pointed out that rigid, jurisdictionselecting choice-of-law rules can produce irrational results.4 For
example, traditional choice-of-law rules for torts dictated that the
law of the place of harm should determine liability. But if a driver
and a passenger from New York proceed in an automobile on a
short round-trip to Ontario and have a one-car accident there
1. See 1 JOSEPH BEALE, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 105 (1916) (“A
right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence
should follow everywhere. Thus, an act valid where done cannot be called into
question anywhere.”). Joseph Beale was the Reporter for the First Restatement
of Conflict of Laws.
2. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 cmt. a (1934).
3. See, e.g., SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT
OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 842 (3d ed. 2012) (“One
reason a plaintiff may choose a particular forum is because of its choice of law
rules.”).
4. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 721–
26 (1963) (asserting in detail that applying Ontario law to an accident involving
only New Yorkers riding together made no sense, even though the accident
occurred in Ontario).
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that injures the passenger, why should Ontario’s law determine
the two New Yorkers’ rights and obligations toward each other?
That makes no sense, said Currie.5 Good point, said the drafters
of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, but we should not
throw out principles of predictability and uniformity altogether.6
In tort and contract cases—among some others, especially those
involving land titles—predictability and uniformity remain
relevant in the Second Restatement, but they become just one
combined factor among a list of factors to be taken into account.7
The Second Restatement’s overall goal is to apply the law of the
state which, with regard to the specific issue, has the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.8
II. Torts and Contracts in the Second Restatement
For torts cases, the Second Restatement supplies a
presumptive choice of law, generally looking to the place of harm
when the parties’ conduct is at issue (for example, having to do
with the rules of the road)9 and looking to the residence or
domicile of one or both parties when loss-allocation is at issue (for
example, whether one party is immune from tort liability to the
other party).10 So far so good, if we are concerned with
5. Id. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with him in Babcock v.
Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 (N.Y. 1963) (applying New York law); see also
Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1216 (1963) (discussing the choice of
law approach taken by the court in Babcock).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. i (1971)
(noting the value of predictability and uniformity).
7. See id. § 6(2)(f) (setting forth the factors for a court to consider in its
analysis). The others are needs of the interstate or international system,
relevant policies of the forum and other interested states, protection of justified
expectations, policies underlying the particular field of law, and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.
8. In the tort and contract contexts, see id. §§ 145, 188.
9. See id. § 145 cmt. d (“A state has an obvious interest in regulating the
conduct of persons within its territory.”).
10. See id. (“The local law of the state where the parties are domiciled,
rather than the local law of the state of conduct and injury, may be applied to
determine whether one party is immune from tort liability to the other.”).
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predictability and uniformity of result, but there is a joker in the
deck. The presumptive choice can be trumped by a laundry list of
principles in section 6, but—as mentioned above—only one of
them has to do with predictability and uniformity.11 Section 6
leaves it to the courts to determine which principles are more
significant in any given case than the others. Unpredictability
and lack of uniformity ensue.
The Second Restatement gives the parties to a contract quite
a bit of leeway to make their own choice of law in the contract
itself, although it limits their ability to determine which state’s
law controls the contract’s validity.12 In the absence of an
effective parties’ choice, the approach is very similar to the
approach for torts: a list of relevant contacts, followed by
comments supplying a presumptive choice of law. Usually it is
the place of contracting for questions of validity (at least, if the
place of contracting is not fortuitous),13 and the place of
performance for questions relating to the nature of performance,
or the party who is to perform, or the details of performance.14
Sometimes it is the situs of the subject matter, as in a contract
insuring against risks in a particular location.15 But again, the
unruly presence of section 6 looms over the whole process.
Courts in the United States have struggled mightily with
choice-of-law issues ever since the choice-of-law revolution began.
Some have stuck with the First Restatement, but they are now in
the distinct minority. Most now apply, or try to apply, the Second
11. See id. § 6(2) (setting forth factors for a court to consider when
conducting a choice of law analysis). For the others, see supra note 7.
12. See id. § 187 (disallowing the parties’ choice regarding validity if there
is no substantial relationship with the chosen state and no other reasonable
basis for the choice, or if application of the chosen state’s law would frustrate a
fundamental policy of a state with a materially greater interest in determining
validity).
13. See id. § 188 cmt. e (noting that the state of contracting usually is also
“the state where the parties conducted the negotiations”).
14. See id. (“The state where performance is to occur under a contract has
an obvious interest in the nature of the performance and in the party who is to
perform.”).
15. See id. (“The state where the thing or the risk is located will have a
natural interest in transactions affecting it. Also the parties will regard the
location of the thing or of the risk as important.”).
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Restatement. A few use other approaches or some hybrid
thereof.16 Even those courts that espouse the First Restatement’s
predictability and uniformity sometimes stray when strict loyalty
would produce a result perceived to be unjust.17
Unpredictability and lack of uniformity may not be the worst
things that could possibly happen in the choice-of-law context,
but unnecessary unpredictability or eclecticism surely should be
avoided if it can be done in a principled way. Happily, a system
can be devised that would simplify the process—thus enhancing
both predictability and uniformity—without discarding all of the
other values implicit in the section 6 laundry list. Moreover, it
can be done without abandoning the basic approach of the Second
Restatement. While preserving that approach, it would breathe
new life into one of the section 6 laundry list items—ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.18
Even better, the approach suggested in this article could and
should become a foundation for the American Law Institute’s
recently proposed Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws, at least
in the torts and contracts fields.19 Because the proposed Third
Restatement “will be similar to its predecessors in structure and
coverage,”20 there would be no barrier to adoption of an approach
that builds on the Second Restatement.
III. A Simplified System for Torts and Contracts

16. For a chart showing each state’s choice-of-law methodology in tort and
contract cases, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual Report, 63 AM. J .COMP. L. (forthcoming
2015).
17. See, e.g., Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 1986) (finding
that the accident state’s automobile guest statute violated West Virginia’s public
policy rather than simply applying West Virginia substantive law to the two
West Virginia parties, despite the case being on all fours with Babcock v.
Jackson).
18. See supra text accompanying note 7 (discussing the factors aside from
uniformity and predictability).
19. The ALI announced the Third Restatement project in November 2014.
See Press Release, Am. L. Inst., (Nov. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.ali.org/email/pr-14-11-17.html.
20. Id.
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Since the Second Restatement contains well-recognized
issue-characterizations (for example, intentional torts as
distinguished from negligent torts,21 or contract validity as
distinguished from most issues relating to contract
performance),22 a court should start the choice-of-law process by
using the Second Restatement’s characterization that best fits the
facts of the case. For most characterizations, the Second
Restatement contains a connecting factor leading to the state
whose law should presumptively be applied.23 In most cases, it
will be the state that would be selected under the First
Restatement’s rigid rules.24
As will be explained below, a court should stick with the
Second Restatement’s presumptive choice of law in tort and
contract cases unless:
(A) it would violate the Constitution to do so; or
(B) the presumptive state is a non-interested state in a false
conflict situation;25 or
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 156 cmt. d (1971)
(“If, under the applicable law, the actor is liable only for intentional injuries, he
will not be held liable for injury caused either by his negligence or by his
recklessness.”).
22. The Second Restatement is not as rigid as the First Restatement
regarding the line to be drawn between contract validity and contract
performance. See id. ch. 8, intro. note (discussing the shift in choice of law in
contract disputes). Nevertheless, the Second Restatement emphasizes the
parties’ expectations and treats place of contracting and place of performance as
separate, relevant factors relating to their expectations as to validity and
performance of a contract. See, e.g., id. § 188 cmt. b (“Protection of justified
expectations plays a less significant role in the choice-of-law process with
respect to issues that involve the nature of the obligations imposed by a contract
upon the parties rather than the validity of the contract or of some provision
thereof.”).
23. “State,” as used in this article, would include a “nation” in a
transnational case.
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 156 cmt.
b(1971) (explaining how courts following the Second Restatement should factor
location into their choice of law analysis).
25. It has been noted that courts already tend to go in this direction, even
though they may not say so. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Methods
for Resolving Tort and Contract Conflict of Laws: The United States and the
European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2053, 2074 (2008) (discussing false conflicts);
see also PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 846–51 (5th ed. 2010).
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(C) application of the presumptive state’s law would defeat
the reasonable expectations of one of the parties; or
(D) application of the presumptive state’s law would defeat or
significantly impair a strong public policy of an interested state
that is also the forum state.
A. A Presumptive Choice of Law that Would Violate the U.S.
Constitution
The choice of a particular state’s law might violate the U.S.
Constitution’s Due Process or Full Faith and Credit Clause,
particularly if it is a choice of the forum state’s own law when the
state’s contacts with, or interest in, the circumstances of the case
are tenuous. The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the
subject has mystified judges and scholars alike, and it will not be
reviewed here.26 Suffice it to say that, obviously, the Constitution
would trump any contrary choice of law.
B. A Non-Interested State in a False-Conflict Situation
Brainerd Currie, the progenitor of interest analysis as a
choice-of-law method, insisted that it “makes no sense
whatever”27 to apply the law of a state that has no interest in
applying its own law. The classic case is Babcock v. Jackson, the
case described above in which two New Yorkers were involved in
a one-car accident in Ontario, and the only question was whether
the negligent driver was liable for the passenger’s injuries.
Ontario had an automobile guest statute that would have
defeated the passenger’s claim, but New York had no guest
statute. New York was interested in applying its own law
(permitting recovery against the driver) to its own citizens, while
Ontario would not be interested in applying its non-liability law
26. For those willing to give it a try, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981) and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The
Hofstra Law Review devoted two entire issues to the Allstate case. See 10
Hofstra L. Rev. No. 1 (1981); id. No. 4 (1982). The results were inconclusive.
27. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 90.
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to the strangers in its territory. In other words, the case
presented a false conflict in favor of New York, as distinguished
from a true conflict in which both states have an interest in
applying their own law.
Unfortunately for judges and litigants, relatively few cases
are so easy. If Babcock v. Jackson had involved an Ontario driver
and a New York passenger, with Ontario law protecting the
negligent driver from liability to the passenger, but New York
law imposing liability on the driver, it would have been a true
conflict. Ontario would have been interested in protecting its own
citizen from liability to a non-Ontario passenger, and New York
would have been interested in giving its citizen a remedy against
the non-New York driver. The choice of law would not be clear on
interest-analysis grounds. The courts have struggled mightily on
how to resolve true conflicts.28 There would be good reason in
such cases simply to stick with the law of the place of harm.
A state’s interest or non-interest can sometimes be assessed
fairly simply, as in the above variation of Babcock v. Jackson. It
is not always so simple. In the more difficult cases, a state’s
interest, or lack thereof, can only be determined with any degree
of confidence by first identifying the policy underlying its relevant
rule of substantive law, and then determining whether that
policy would be served by applying its law to the specific facts of
the case at hand. It may be tempting, or even necessary, to
speculate about the policy when a court in one state is looking at
another state’s law and there is no clear statement of policy by
that state’s highest court and no relevant legislative history.
Fertile imaginations can be useful in some scenarios, but rarely
in this one.
The New York Court of Appeals learned this lesson in a pair
of later cases involving two New Yorkers in the same car. In the
first of these two cases, Dym v. Gordon,29 the New Yorkers were
in Colorado. Because of the New York driver’s negligence, their
28. For samplings of such cases, see HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER &
KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 175–223
(9th ed. 2013); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL—CASES AND MATERIALS 215–63
(3d ed. 2012).
29. 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965).
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car collided with another car on a Colorado road. The New York
Court of Appeals speculated that “Colorado has an interest in
seeing that the negligent defendant's assets are not dissipated in
order that the persons in the car of the blameless driver will not
have their right to recovery diminished by the present suit.”30 The
existence of such a third party, said the majority opinion in Dym
v. Gordon, was enough to distinguish Babcock v. Jackson, where
there was no third party. Four years later, the New York Court of
Appeals said that the construction placed on the Colorado guest
statute in Dym v. Gordon “was mistaken.”31 It was too
speculative.
In Dym v. Gordon, as in Babcock v. Jackson, there was a
false conflict in favor of New York. On the other hand, if Colorado
actually had a policy to protect non-negligent third parties as the
New York court postulated in Dym v. Gordon, and if the third
parties were Coloradans, there would be no reason to depart from
the Second Restatement’s presumptive choice of Colorado law.
The case would have presented a true conflict and the court’s
outcome in Dym v. Gordon would have been correct.
A recent case in the Western District of New York illustrates
how a court that labored to reach the correct decision could have
done it without so much effort. The case arose from a crash of a
commuter aircraft in 2009 on its final approach to the Buffalo
Niagara International Airport. All forty-five passengers and the
crew were killed. One of the plaintiffs in the ensuing consolidated
action against the airline was domiciled in China, as had been his
wife, who was killed in the crash. The federal district court,
applying New York choice-of-law rules under the Klaxon case,32
went through a six-page analysis to determine whether to apply
New York’s generous measure of damages, as urged by the
plaintiff, or China’s more restrictive measure, as urged by the
airline. After analyzing several New York cases, none of which
was directly on point, the court decided to apply New York law.33
30. Id. at 794.
31. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 397 (N.Y. 1969).
32. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)
(concluding that the Erie doctrine applies to choice of law in a diversity case).
33. See In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., New York, 983 F. Supp. 2d 249,
252–58 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the court’s choice of law analysis). The court
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It would have been much easier if New York (and hence the
federal court) had used the choice-of-law method suggested in
this article. The federal court would have stuck with the Second
Restatement’s presumptive state (New York, the place of harm),
because China clearly would have had no interest in applying its
restrictive recovery rule in favor of the U.S. airline and against
the Chinese domiciliary. It would not have been a false conflict in
favor of China. Under the approach suggested in this article, it is
unnecessary to determine whether New York would be interested
in applying its own law because the presumption favoring the
place of harm could be rebutted only if the other state (or nation,
in this case) has an interest in applying its own law.
Another recent personal injury diversity case in New York
illustrates how the approach suggested in this article would work
if there is a true conflict. A New York worker was injured in New
York while operating a machine manufactured in Ohio. New
York’s loss-allocating law favored the worker; Ohio law favored
the manufacturer. The federal court analyzed several New York
cases and concluded that New York law should be applied.34 If
New York used the approach put forward in this article, the court
would simply explain that it was not a false conflict in favor of
Ohio, so the loss-allocating law of New York, the place of injury,
would apply. If there had been a true conflict between conductregulating rules, the Second Restatement’s presumptive choice
would normally be the place of conduct, and that state’s law
would be applied.35
Even in tort cases involving no physical injury, the approach
suggested here should be used. For example, in a recent diversity
paid particular attention to the leading New York tort choice-of-law case,
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (1972), which sets forth a threerule framework for resolving choice-of-law issues in cases involving conflicting
loss-allocating laws.
34. Fargas v. Cincinnati Mach., LLC, 986 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmts. c–e (1971)
(explaining how the presumption usually works); Williams v. Novartis Pharm.
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 761, 766 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (applying the law of the place of
conduct when the rule is intended to deter or punish conduct); Kirchman v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 8:06-cv-1787-T-24-TBM, 2014 WL 2722483, at *4
(M.D. Fla. June 16, 2014) (approving the reasoning in Williams).
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case, the federal district court in Connecticut addressed issues
relating to misappropriation of trade secrets in much the same
manner as suggested here.36 Pepsico, headquartered in New
York, allegedly misappropriated trade secrets of the plaintiff
company headquartered in Connecticut. The plaintiff relied on a
Connecticut statute that would provide a claim for relief, but
there was no comparable law in New York. Although the court
did not quite use the language of interest analysis, it effectively
recognized that there was a true conflict on this issue. It looked to
the Second Restatement’s presumptive choice of law stressing the
place where the conduct occurred (here, New York) in
misappropriation cases. The court stuck with it and correctly
declined to apply the Connecticut statute.37
In another recent tort diversity case where there was no
physical injury, members of a non-profit organization sued the
organization for unjust enrichment.38 They claimed that they
were led to believe that their payments of special assessments
that the organization imposed were required for their
membership, when in fact the payments were not required. The
organization was headquartered in Washington, D.C., where the
law provided no such remedy. The plaintiffs resided in California,
where a statutory remedy was available. The Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, relying on a case that the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals decided,39 recognized that it was a true conflict
and applied forum law as a tiebreaker after a four-page analysis
involving a “qualitative weighing” of relevant factors.40 The
Second Restatement’s presumptive choice would have been
California law because California was the state in which the
plaintiffs received and relied on the defendant’s misleading
36. See Bulldog N.Y. LLC v. Pepsico, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 152, 154 (D. Conn.
2014) (describing the court’s choice of law analysis).
37. Id. at 162–63 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §
145 cmt f). The remainder of the court’s opinion fell short of the approach
suggested in this article.
38. In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
39. Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 179 (D.C.
2006).
40. In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d at 51–55 (explaining the
“qualitative weighing” characterization on page 51).

82

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2015)

representations.41 If the earlier D.C. case had used the approach
suggested in this article, the federal court would have followed
that approach under the Klaxon case42 and should have stuck
with California law to resolve the true conflict. The judicial task
would have been much simpler, and the result would have been
both rational and fair.
In an invasion-of-privacy case, 43 the federal district court in
Colorado reached the correct conclusion, but could have done it
more easily if it had used the approach suggested here. A samesex New Jersey married couple and their wedding photographer
brought the invasion-of-privacy action against Colorado political
advocacy organizations. The organizations had circulated, in
Colorado, a photograph of the couple kissing at their wedding.
The organizations’ aim was to discredit some political candidates
in Colorado who advocated legalizing same-sex relationships. One
of the defendants, a Colorado organization, argued that the
defendant-favoring New Jersey tort law should be applied to the
dispute.44 The Colorado Supreme Court in another case had
adopted the Restatement Second’s most-significant-relationship
test for multi-state torts.45 The federal court in the case at hand
ploughed through all the factors in Restatement Second section
145 and concluded that they weighed in favor of Colorado law,
rather than New Jersey law.46 In a footnote,47 the court said there
was no need to apply Restatement Second section 152, which
would have made its job easier. Under section 152 and its
comment c, the place of invasion of privacy would be applied, and
when the invasion involves the publication of information about
the plaintiff or the appropriation of his or her likeness, the
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148 cmts. f, g
(1971).
42. Supra note 32.
43. See Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1353 (D.
Colo. 2014) (choosing between New Jersey and Colorado law).
44. See id. (discussing various arguments on choice of law).
45. See AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 P.3d 507, 508 (Colo.
2007) (choosing to follow the most-significant-relationship test for certain torts
cases).
46. See Hill, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 1355 (applying Colorado law).
47. See id., n.2 (discussing the Second Restatement, but stating that it did
not need to use it to reach its result).
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invasion is where the matter was communicated to someone other
than the plaintiff.48 That would be Colorado in this case. There
would be no reason to depart from the presumptive choice
because New Jersey would not be interested in protecting the
Colorado defendant, and there would be no other reason to depart
from the presumptive choice of Colorado law.
The approach suggested here could be used in multistate
defamation cases as well. The Second Restatement’s presumptive
choice would normally be the state where the person claiming to
be harmed (the plaintiff) is domiciled, if the allegedly defamatory
matter was published in that state.49 If that state’s law favors the
defendant, there would not be a false conflict in favor of any other
state: if the law of the defendant’s domicile also favors the
defendant, there would be no conflict of laws; if the law of the
defendant’s domicile favors the plaintiff, that state would have no
interest in applying its own law. In either case, the Restatement’s
presumptive choice would normally carry the day, and the
plaintiff would not prevail.50 If the law of the plaintiff’s domicile
favors the plaintiff (for example, if it considers the matter
defamatory to the plaintiff), and if the state of the defendant’s
domicile does not consider the matter defamatory, there would be
a true conflict. The court should again stick with the
Restatement’s presumptive choice, but this time it would lead to
the plaintiff’s recovery if the defamation can be proved and if
there is no constitutional impediment.
This article’s approach would also be effective in the context
of interstate contracts. Determining what is or is not a false
conflict might in some cases require a somewhat different
approach than in the typical tort case, but the goal would remain
the same: to determine whether there is a false conflict in favor of
a state other than the presumptive state. Thus, if the issue is the
contract’s validity and the presumptive state—usually the place
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 152 (1971); id. cmt.
c (discussing choice of law for invasion of privacy claims).
49. See id. § 150(2) (showing how the specific rule changes the
presumption).
50. This result was reached in Catalanello v. Kramer, 18 F. Supp. 3d 504,
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), although the court did not use the reasoning I have
suggested in this article.
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of the last event necessary to complete the making of the
contract—is not the residence or domicile of either party, it might
still be an interested state if, for example, it is a commercial
center that benefits from drawing in non-resident parties to make
their deals. If so, there would not be a false conflict in favor of a
state other than the presumptive state, even if the law of the
other state would favor its own resident.
A Connecticut Supreme Court decision51 nicely illustrates the
approach in a contracts context. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. sued
several of its liability insurance carriers to determine the
coverage for cleaning up environmental contamination at
Reichold’s facility in Tacoma, Washington. The issues concerned
interpretation of pollution-exclusion clauses in the insurance
contracts and allocation of damages among the carriers. The
contracts did not contain choice-of-law clauses. All insurance
carriers either were headquartered in New York or dealt with the
plaintiff through their New York offices. New York law favored
the insurers; Washington law favored the insured.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, following the Restatement
Second’s approach for risk-insurance contracts,52 began with a
presumption favoring the law of the place where the insured risk
is located. The court then found that New York and Washington
were both interested states and said, “[W]e cannot conclude that
New York’s interests so substantially outweigh Washington’s
interests as to overcome the presumption of § 193 of the
Restatement (Second).”53 In other words, it was a true conflict,
and the court stuck with the presumptive choice of law.
C. The Reasonable Expectations of One of the Parties
Obviously, a court should try not to defeat the expectations of
a party that has reasonably relied on a promise that another
party made, unless there is an overriding public policy reason to
51. See Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 750 A.2d
1051, 1054 (Conn. 2000) (conducting choice of law analysis in a contracts case).
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193.
53. See Reichhold, 750 A.2d at 1057 (explaining the reasoning for their
choice).
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do so. In the choice-of-law context, a clear case for contract
enforcement would be one in which parties with comparable
bargaining power have agreed on a choice-of-law clause in their
contract, and one party has relied on it. Even if there has been no
actual reliance, a choice-of-law clause in a non-adhesion contract
should normally be enforced, at least if the chosen state has some
reasonable relationship with the parties or the transaction. And
even in a form contract, a choice-of-law clause should normally be
enforced if the party seeking escape from it was given reasonable
notice of it before the contract was signed and was not otherwise
treated unfairly in the contracting process.
Of course, reasonable expectations regarding choice of law in
a contract situation could exist even if there is no choice-of-law
clause in the contract. For example, if the parties have negotiated
a contract that is to be performed largely or entirely in the state
where the negotiations occurred, normally the expectation would
be that the law of that state would apply to the agreement. A
court should be reluctant to apply the law of some other state
that would invalidate the contract or adversely affect the
performance of one of the parties. Other examples could be given.
The point is simply that reasonable expectations regarding
applicable law may arise in a variety of situations and should
normally be respected.
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Reichhold, discussed
above, considered not only the states’ interests, but also the
parties’ expectations. The court said
As an additional important consideration, the application of a
state’s law should not run counter to the justified expectations
of the parties . . . . Applying Washington law, however, does
not violate the justified expectations of the parties when the
targeted site is in Washington and the other risks that they
insured are located in multiple jurisdictions all outside New
York.54

The court got it right.

54.

Id. at 1058.
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D. The Public Policy Exception

If applying the law of another state would defeat or
significantly impair a clear and firmly-held public policy of an
interested forum state, the forum state cannot be expected—in
the absence of Constitutional compulsion—to apply the other
state’s law, even if the other state’s law would normally be
chosen. This escape device should be applied sparingly, especially
if the other state is another state of the United States rather than
a foreign nation.55 Justice Cardozo (then a judge on the New York
Court of Appeals) said it best: the public policy escape device
should be applied only when the other state’s law would truly
“violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal.”56
Courts in the United States that still follow the rigid First
Restatement place-of-wrong rule for torts have sometimes been
tempted to stretch the public policy escape device to avoid the
First Restatement result. In Paul v. National Life,57 the West
Virginia Supreme Court used it to avoid applying an Indiana
guest statute that would have precluded recovery by a West
Virginia passenger against a West Virginia driver stemming from
a one-car accident in Indiana. Justice Cardozo surely did not have
this sort of case in mind when he penned the public policy test
quoted above. In this Babcock v. Jackson situation, it would be
much more convincing simply to recognize that Indiana was a
non-interested state in a false-conflict situation. West Virginia
law would be chosen on that basis rather than on public policy
grounds.
Public policy cases in the contracts context often involve an
adhesion contract with a dispute-settlement clause that is valid
in the contracting state, but that is deemed procedurally and
55. If the other state is a state of the United States, the Constitution’s Full
Faith and Credit clause could preclude the use of a public policy escape device in
some circumstances. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 634 (1935);
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 590 (1947).
56. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E.2d 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
57. See Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 556 (choosing not to apply
Indiana law under the public policy exception) (W. Va. 1986).
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substantively unconscionable in the state of the party resisting
its enforcement. These cases are usually true conflicts, so the only
persuasive reason to depart from the presumptive choice of law is
the strong public policy of the forum.58 That is appropriate if the
unconscionability escape device is not being used simply as a
crutch to choose the forum’s own law.
The public policy exception should be used only if the forum
state’s own public policy is at stake. A forum state simply is not
well equipped to figure out another state’s public policy and apply
it to override the otherwise-applicable choice of law. A recent
personal injury case in the federal district court in West Virginia
is illustrative.59 A group of West Virginia plaintiffs brought a
class action against the Massachusetts manufacturer of
transvaginal surgical mesh, alleging that after it had been
implanted, it had caused them severe complications. The
plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages. The
defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the punitive
damages claim, arguing that Massachusetts substantive law
should be applied. The plaintiffs argued for application of West
Virginia’s plaintiff-favoring law. West Virginia still follows the
traditional place-of-harm rule for tort cases, so the federal court
in West Virginia held in favor of the plaintiffs. The result should
be the same under the approach suggested in this article, but the
reasoning would be slightly different. The court would first look
to the place of harm under the Second Restatement and then
would determine whether to apply any of the four possible
exceptions set forth earlier in this article. The only one that
might arguably apply would be the public policy exception,
because Massachusetts presumably would want its defendantfavoring policy to be applied in favor of the Massachusetts
defendant. True enough, but West Virginia had a competing
public policy that would favor the plaintiffs. The court in West
Virginia could not reasonably be expected to weigh the

58. See, e.g., Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 303 P.3d 814, 817
(N.M. 2013) (looking at public policy to make a choice of law decision).
59. See Hendricks v. Boston Scientific Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 638, 641 (S.D.
W. Va. 2014) (choosing between Massachusetts and West Virginia law).
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inconsistent public policies against each other. It should (and did)
stick with the place-of-harm rule.
IV. Conclusion
Choice of law in a tort or contract case does not have to be as
difficult as the courts or the commentators have made it.
Principled simplicity in this context would not only rein in forum
shopping; it would also free up judicial resources, reduce the cost
of litigation, and provide a legal structure that is understandable
not only for judges and lawyers, but also for the ordinary citizens
who are subject to it. These are laudable and attainable goals.

